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Steven L. Wise 
Linda L. Roos 
The University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Metacognition refers to thinking about thinking, or more gener-
ally, to using higher-level knowledge and strategies to regulate lower-
level performance. Previous research suggests that metacognition is 
an important part of learning among adults (Baker, 1989; Garner & 
Alexander, 1989; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990) and children (Alexander, 
Carr, & Schwanenflugel, 1995; Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992). 
Metacognition contributes to learning in several ways, but especially 
by helping learners to use their attentional resources more efficiently, 
to process information at a deeper level, and to monitor their perfor-
mance more accurately. 
Notwithstanding its importance, there is considerable debate 
regarding how to measure meta cognition. At the heart of the problem 
is the elusive nature of metacognitive knowledge itself. Most theo-
rists assume meta cognitive knowledge is highly abstract and cuts 
across domain-specific boundaries (Brown, 1987; Flavell, 1987; Paris 
& Byrnes, 1989; Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995; Schraw & 
Moshman,1995). In contrast, most declarative and procedural knowl-
edge in memory is welded to a specific domain, and can be stated as 
a declarative fact or demonstrated through a procedure. As a result, 
declarative and procedural knowledge are much easier to identify, 
manipulate, and measure than metacognitive knowledge. Added to 
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this is the fact that metacognitive knowledge is acquired gradually 
over long periods of time, emerges relatively late in development, and 
often is difficult to explicate even when an individual demonstrates a 
high degree of metacognitive competence (Brown, 1987; Garner, 1994; 
Weinert & Kluwe, 1987). 
Another problem is that metacognitive processes such as plan-
ning and evaluation are difficult to measure directly. 
For this reason, researchers have relied on a variety of indirect 
measures such as verbal reports, think-alouds, self-report inventories, 
and subjective measures of performance accuracy. One consequence 
of the unobservable nature of metacognitive knowledge and regula-
tion is that researchers have focused their attention on several specific 
aspects of metacognition that are easier to measure than others, 
especially various forms of monitoring. Most studies have focused on 
memory monitoring (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; Johnson, 
Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 1994; Lovelace, 1984; Koriat, 1993; Schneider & 
Pressley, 1989), comprehension monitoring (Glenberg & Epstein, 1985; 
Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Weaver, 1990), or performance monitoring 
(Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1987; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). 
This chapter addresses problems related to the measurement of 
metacognition in greater detail. We believe that some of the more 
imposing obstacles can be addressed successfully via computer-based 
testing procedures, but especially those pertaining to the assessment 
of metacognitive control processes. We will argue that computer-
based testing provides opportunities for researchers to measure con-
trol processes with much greater precision than with noncomputerized 
methodologies. Computer-based testing enables us to do so in an 
unobtrusive, reliable manner that is less apt to be confounded by 
pre experimental knowledge and ability. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections. The 
first of these provides a brief overview of previous research and 
presents a multilevel model of metacognition that distinguishes be-
tween two major components, including knowledge about and regu-
lation of cognitive processes and knowledge. We further distinguish 
between two subcomponents of meta cognitive regulation, including 
meta cognitive control and monitoring. Control processes are used to 
select performance goals and guide ongoing cognitive activities. 
Monitoring processes are used to evaluate the present success of one's 
performance and the degree to which one has met one's long-term 
performance goals. We assume that control and monitoring are 
reciprocally linked in a manner that facilitates self-regulation during 
performance. 
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The overview is followed by a section that outlines some of the 
methodological shortcomings of previous research. These include 
issues pertaining to the reliability and construct validity of dependent 
variables used in these studies. Of greater importance, this section 
considers how dependence on a limited repertoire of methodological 
strategies has precluded inquiry along two important lines. The first 
concerns the investigation of metacognitive control. We believe that 
few studies have investigated control processes at all, and that none 
have done so directly. The second line of inquiry concerns the 
relationship between control and monitoring processes. Current 
conceptualizations of metacognition make a number of assumptions 
about this relationship that have not been tested empirically. 
The next section provides a review of recent developments in 
computer-based testing that offer great promise for the measurement 
of metacognition. These include the contribution of item-response 
theory to the rapidly growing field of computerized adaptive testing 
(i.e., tests in which a computer-controlled algorithm selects test items 
from a multilevel, calibrated item pool) and self-adapted testing (i.e., 
tests in which examinees select item of a designated difficulty level 
from a multilevel, calibrated item pool). 
We consider ways that self-adapted testing (SAT) can be applied 
to the measurement of metacognition in the next section. This 
includes some of the psychometric advantages of SAT as well as a 
description of on-line measures of cognitive and metacognitive be-
havior that can be used to test the model of metacognition proposed 
later in this chapter. Specifically, we address how SAT can be used to 
assess metacognitive control in a variety of ways, including a measure 
of how accurately individuals select test items, as well as selection 
times, item response times, and across-test item selection strategies. 
The final section outlines an agenda for future research using 
SAT. One important goal of this research is to link the kinds of data 
collected in previous studies with the kind of on-line measures 
available in SAT. Among other things, this would enable researchers 
to compare the reliability of subjective paper-and-pencil judgments 
made before, during, or after testing to objective measures collected 
during SAT. Ideally, one would hope for a strong correspondence 
between the two; however, one possibility is that pre- and post-test 
subjective judgments do not correspond closely to actual on-line item 
selection strategies. Another goal is that researchers investigate in 
detail the relationship between control and monitoring. One would 
expect these processes to be linked reciprocally, even though there is 
no direct empirical evidence to support this assumption. Establishing 
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such a relationship would suggest that control and monitoring pro-
cesses are part of a larger regulatory system. In contrast, finding that 
the two processes are not related strongly would suggest that each is 
governed by a separate reservoir of knowledge. 
The final section of the paper summarizes our main points and 
offers some general conclusions. Chief among these is the claim that 
researchers may benefit by incorporating recent innovations from the 
computer-based testing community, and by using SAT to bridge the 
gap between existing metacognitive theory and empirical studies that 
do not adequately address questions raised by this theory. 
COGNITIVE AN D METACOGNITIVE PROCESSES 
Individuals rely on both cognitive and metacognitive skills when 
learning (Garner & Alexander, 1989; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 
1987). Cognitive skills are those that help a person perform a task; 
metacognitive skills are those that help a person regulate and monitor 
task performance (Artzt & Armour-Thomas, 1992; Schraw, 1994; Slife 
& Weaver, 1992). Metacognition is thought to include two main 
components (Baker & Brown, 1984; Brown, 1987; Jacobs & Paris, 
1987). The first, knowledge of cognition, refers to what individuals 
know about their own cognition or about cognition in general. It 
usually includes three different kinds of metacognitive awareness: 
declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge (Brown, 1987; 
Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Declarative knowl-
edge refers to knowing "about" things. Procedural knowledge refers 
to knowing "how" to do things. Conditional knowledge refers to 
knowing the "why" and "when" aspects of cognition. The second, 
regulation of cognition, refers to metacognitive activities that help 
control and monitor one's learning. Although a number of regulatory 
skills have been described in the literature (Jacobs & Paris, 1987; 
Kluwe, 1987), two that appear to be essential are control and monitor-
ing processes. 
A growing number of studies have been conducted over the past 
decade investigating these components. Those focusing on the knowl-
edge of cognition component typically employed either think-aloud 
(Swanson, 1990) or self-report measures (Dixon, Hultsch, & Hertzog, 
1988; Schraw & Delmison, 1994). Those focusing on the regulation of 
cognition component, but especially the monitoring subcomponent, 
typically employed some form of priming task, or asked individuals 
to make subjective judgments of coniidence, ease of comprehension, 
or overall learning prior to or subsequent to completing a test 
5. METACOGNITION AND COMPUTER-BASED TESTING 227 
(Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1987; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; 
Weaver, 1990). 
Unfortunately, because many of these studies used widely 
different materials, data collection procedures, and criterion mea-
sures, results are mixed and often difficult to compare. In lieu of 
a comprehensive review of these diverse findings, we turn briefly 
to a summary of recent research investigating the control and 
monitoring subcomponents. We do so for two reasons. One is to 
provide a more detailed definition of each construct. A second is 
to delineate the strengths and weaknesses of recent empirical 
research. 
Research on Control 
Metacognitive control refers to regulatory processes that occur 
prior to or during a learning activity tha t direct the course of cognitive 
activities. These processes include but are not restricted to planning, 
allocating resources, selecting strategies, and setting specific perfor-
mance goals. Control processes typically are assumed to guide 
cognitive activities in a top-down manner (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 
1994). Most theorists also assume that control processes are inten-
tional, nonautomated, and partially statable (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 
1990; Pressley, Harris, & Marks, 1992). 
Many studies have investigated the effect of strategy instruction 
on meta cognitive control (see Garner, 1987; Pressley et al., 1987; 
Pressley, 1995, for reviews). These studies invariably indicate that 
strategy instruction increases metacognitive control in two ways: 
through better use of limited cognitive resources and more elabora-
tive processing (Willoughby, Wood, & Khan, 1994; Wood, Pressley, & 
Winne, 1990). However, few of these studies have shown attempts to 
assess the accuracy of enhanced control processes, the degree to 
which learners have metacognitive awareness about enhanced con-
trol, and the extent to which enhanced control is related to monitoring 
accuracy. 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between 
control and monitoring more directly. Pressley and colleagues 
(see Pressley & Ghatala, 1990, for a review) found that experimen-
tal manipulations that improved performance (presumably by 
enhancing meta cognitive control) did not lead to more accurate 
monitoring among college students . In contrast, Maki and col-
leagues (Maki & Serra, 1992; Maki, Foley, Kajer, Thompson, & 
Willert, 1990) found that experimental manipulations that neces-
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sitated deeper information processing (e.g., asking readers to gener-
ate missing text information) led to more accurate monitoring. 
Other studies have used estimates of future performance on a 
specific task as a measure of metacognitive control. Schraw (1994) 
asked college students to estimate their ability to monitor accurately 
their reading comprehension. Control predictions were correlated 
positively (i.e., p < .01) with test performance and post-test estimates 
of monitoring accuracy. Levels of self-assessed monitoring ability 
also were related to item-by-item and end-of-test monitoring accu-
racy. Those who rated themselves as normatively accurate monitors 
tended to be more accurate and to improve more than poor monitors 
as a function of self-generated feedback. These findings suggested 
that older learners possess knowledge about metacognitive processes 
and use this knowledge strategically to control their performance and 
monitoring. 
A follow-up study by Schraw (1995) examined performance con-
trol judgments (i.e., pretest estimates of one's ability to perform well 
in a specific domain) across a variety of content domains and test 
formats. Results indicated that control judgments were correlated 
positively among domains even when test performance was con-
trolled statistically. This suggested that metacognitive control may 
be a domain-general rather than domain-specific phenomenon. How-
ever, control judgments across different types of tests (i.e., recogni-
tion of facts versus recall of inferential relationships) were unrelated. 
This suggested that control judgments may be dependent on the 
specific cognitive processes required of a particular test format (see 
Pressley & Ghatala, 1990, and Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1994, for a 
further discussion). 
Research on Monitoring 
Metacognitive monitoring refers to processes that occur during or 
after a learning activity that provide information about the effective-
ness of those activities. These processes are used to evaluate the 
present success of one's performance and the degree to which one has 
met one's long-term performance goals. Monitoring is important 
because it provides self-generated feedback to the control system. 
Without accurate monitoring, efficient control of one's performance 
may be impossible. Most theorists assume that monitoring is a data-
driven process; that is, monitoring accuracy may be a function of 
domain familiarity, automaticity, and task difficulty (Koriat, 1993; 
Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994). 
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Monitoring studies typically require individuals to make subjec-
tive judgments of learning or test performance during or after an 
initial study phase. Judgments are made for each test item using a 5-
or 7-point Likert scale, although some researchers have used other 
techniques such as a continuous, bipolar scale adapted from the 
multidimensional literature (see Schraw, Potenza, & Nebelsick-Gul-
let, 1993, for a further description) . The main purpose of these studies 
is to determine the degree to which individuals accurately assess their 
learning and performance. 
Four types of judgments have been used in the adult monitoring 
literature, including ease of learning (i.e., judgments of encoding diffi-
culty), judgments of learning (i.e., the degree to which information was 
learned during the study phase), feeling of knowing (i.e., the degree to 
which one has access to previously learned information in memory), 
and pelformance judgments (i.e., assessments of performance accuracy). 
These four types of judgments have been used by researchers to 
operationalize metacognitive processes involved in the acquisition, 
retention, and retrieval of information (Nelson & Narens, 1994). 
Monitoring studies differ widely with respect to the type of 
criterion measure used to assess monitoring ability. Many studies use 
some form of correlation, although a number of studies report other 
measures such as bias (Schraw & Roedel, 1994), accuracy (Tobias, 
1996), discrimination (Lundeberg, Fox, & Puncochar, 1994), or a 
multicomponent measure based on bias, correlation, and discrimina-
tion (Yates, 1990). Currently, there is widespread disagreement about 
the relative effectiveness of these measures (Keren, 1991; Liberman & 
Tversky, 1993; Nelson, 1984; Schraw, 1995). One point of agreement 
is that different criterion measures affect both observed results and 
how researchers interpret these results. 
These studies generally suggest that adults monitor their learning 
and performance with a moderate degree of success, although results 
vary from study to study. Surprisingly, monitoring proficiency does 
not appear to be related strongly to relevant domain knowledge 
(Glenberg & Epstein, 1987; Morris, 1990; Schraw et al., 1995) or 
academic achievement (Pressley & Ghatala, 1988, 1990). These con-
clusions have been supported in the children's monitoring literature 
as well, although there is considerable debate regarding whether 
children monitor as accurately as adults (Alexander, Carr, & 
Schwanenflugel, 1995; Butterfield, Nelson, & Peck, 1988). 
Situational constraints also affect estimates of monitoring profi-
ciency. One constraint is the point in the learning-test sequence in 
which monitoring judgments are made. A number of studies indicate 
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that calibration of comprehension (i.e., the correlation between pretest 
judgments and actual test performance) is often quite poor, with most 
studies reporting correlations in the .00 to .25 range (Glenberg et al., 
1987; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). In contrast, calibration of perfor-
mance (i.e., the correlation between posttestjudgments and actual test 
performance) appears to be much better in both children and adults, 
often ranging from .30 to .50 (Glenberg et al., 1987; Maki & Serra, 1992; 
Maki et al., 1990; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). 
A second constraint is that specific testing conditions affect moni-
toring proficiency. For example, calibration of comprehension can be 
improved under the following circumstances: (a) when adjunct ques-
tions similar to post-test questions are provided during study (Pressley, 
Snyder, Levin, Murray, & Ghatala, 1987), (b) when periodic feedback 
is provided to test takers (Ghatala, Levin, Foorman, & Pressley, 1989), 
(c) when expert knowledge about the to-be-Iearned material is mini-
mized (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987), and (d) when test takers generated 
missing text information (Maki et al., 1990). Surprisingly, calibration 
of comprehension does not appear to improve when learners were 
specifically requested to monitor their comprehension or when they 
are given the opportunity to re-study the to-be-Iearned materials 
(Ghatala et al., 1989), or when they were given practice questions 
prior to study (Maki & Serra, 1992). 
Like calibration of comprehension, calibration of performance 
improved under a number of testing conditions, especially when 
adjunct questions were provided during the study phase (Pressley et 
al., 1988), when test takers received external incentives to improve 
monitoring accuracy (Schraw et al., 1994), and when test takers 
received recall rather than recognition tests (Pressley, Ghatala, 
Woloshyn, & Pirie, 1990). Calibration of performance also was related 
to level of test performance (Schraw & Roedel, 1994). Individuals 
monitored with less bias when judging their performance on easy 
rather than more difficult items. 
A third general constraint is that monitoring proficiency im-
proves with feedback, incentives, practice, and training. Stock, 
Kulhavy, Pridemore, and Krug (1992) found that experimenter-pro-
vided feedback increased the accuracy of confidence judgments. 
Schraw (1994) reported that pre-experimental estimates of monitoring 
proficiency were related to both local (i.e., the accuracy of item-
specific performance judgments made during testing) and global (i.e., 
judgments of overall performance made after testing) monitoring 
accuracy. The accuracy of local monitoring was correlated positively 
to the accuracy of global monitoring. In addition, the change in 
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monitoring accuracy between local and global monitoring improved 
significantly among good monitors, but did not improve among poor 
monitors. 
Monitoring proficiency also improves when individuals are given 
incentives to monitor their performance more accurately. Schrawet 
al. (1993) found that additional course credit for normatively high 
monitoring accuracy led to more accurate monitoring, whereas addi-
tional credit for normatively high test performance had no effect on 
monitoring accuracy. In addition, incentives to monitor more accu-
rately improved test performance even though incentives to perform 
better did not. 
Monitoring training also improves performance. Delclos and 
Harrington (1991) examined fifth and sixth grader's ability to solve 
computer problems after assignment to one of three conditions. The 
first group received specific problem-solving training, the second 
received problem-solving plus self-monitoring training and practice, 
and the third received no training. The monitored problem-solving 
group solved more of the difficult problems than either of the remain-
ing groups and took less time to do so. The group receiving problem-
solving and monitoring training also solved complex problems faster 
than the control group. 
Summary 
The control and monitoring research summarized above leads to 
a number of conclusions. Regarding control, most adults achieve 
some degree of metacognitive control by using helpful learning 
strategies. Second, many adults possess some explicit metacognitive 
knowledge about their ability to control performance. Third, 
metacognitive control in one domain tends to be related to control in 
another domain, even when performance is taken into consideration. 
Fourth, metacognitive control appears to be superior in adults 
(Alexander et al., 1995). 
Regarding monitoring, adults monitor their performance with a 
moderate degree of accuracy. Monitoring improves as tests become 
easier and more factual. Second, monitoring proficiency appears to 
be independent of intellectual ability (Alexander et al., 1995; Swanson, 
1990) and academic achievement (Pressley & Ghatala, 1988). Third, 
monitoring proficiency may be independent or even negatively re-
lated to domain knowledge (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987), independent 
of ease of comprehension judgments (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990), but 
correlated with other types of metacognitive knowledge (Schraw, 
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1994; Schraw & Dennison, 1994). Fourth, one's ability to monitor one's 
performance may improve with practice (Delclos & Harrington, 1991). 
PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT MEASUREMENT APPROACHES 
It could be argued that the gap between metacognitive theory and 
empirical research is as great as any other area of psychological 
inquiry. These are several specific reasons for this state of affairs, 
many of them being methodological in nature (Kruglanski, 1989). 
This section divides these problems into three interrelated categories 
that are ranked ordered from our vantage point in order of impor-
tance. The three categories include task, test, and person constraints on 
the measurement of control and monitoring. 
Task Constraints 
Task constraints refer to characteristics of the experimental task 
that impede measurement of either control or monitoring processes. 
The most serious obstacle is that researchers cannot manipulate either 
control or monitoring processes directly, but must be content to 
manipulate the task environment in which control and monitoring are 
performed. This means that researchers must make inferences about 
complex metacognitive processes on the basis of indirect measures. 
Although this is certainly not a new problem to psychologists, it is a 
serious one. 
Operationalizing metacognitive control has been an especially 
virulent problem. Presumably, the best way to study control pro-
cesses would be to allow the examinee to exercise a great deal of 
strategic control over his or her performance. Previous studies have 
attempted to do so by providing specific task information, learning 
goals, opportunity to study, strategies for learning, or conditions 
under which learning is facilitated. In essence, these studies exam-
ined whether a variety of experimental factors affected metacognitive 
control. However, none of these studies allowed examinees to dem-
onstrate overtly in a directly observable manner how they attempted 
to control their test-taking behavior. One way to do so would be 
through the use of on-line verbal protocols in which individuals 
describe their cognitive processes (Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Pressley & 
Afflerbach, 1995). However, although an important research tool, 
verbal reports are intrusive, resource consuming, and assume that 
individuals have explicit access to metacognitive processes. 
An alternative would be to study the way examinees make 
strategic choices throughout a test. In self-adapted testing, for ex-
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ample, individuals choose test items of a designated difficulty level 
from a multilevel, calibrated item pool. This may enable researchers 
to examine several aspects of metacognitive control in an explicit, yet 
unobtrusive manner. One aspect is the goodness of fit (i.e., calibration 
accuracy) between self-selected items and observed performance. 
Another aspect is whether examinees show evidence of improved 
accuracy over the course of the entire test. 
A somewhat different task constraint is introduced when re-
searchers ask examinees to make subjective judgments of learning 
and performance while simultaneously performing complex tasks. 
Researchers invariably assume that such ratings have little effect on 
performance, although oddly, there are no empirical studies we know 
of that have investigated this assumption. Of greater importance, 
researchers also assume that the demands of taking a test have little 
impact on the accuracy of subjective ratings. This assumption clearly 
is untenable in that confidence judgments become increasingly more 
biased as a function of test difficulty (Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Schwartz 
& Metcalfe, 1994). Although researchers have attempted to compen-
sate for such problems via the judicious use of statistical analyses (cf. 
Nelson, 1984), no amount of statistical tinkering can eliminate these 
problems entirely (cf. Funder, 1987; Keren, 1991; Liberman & Tversky, 
1993; Schraw, 1995). 
Test Constraints 
Test constraints refer to characteristics of the test itself, rather than 
the test environment, that impede measurement of either control or 
monitoring processes. A recent review by Schwartz and Metcalfe 
(1994) addressed four test-related problems that we summarize here. 
One source of variation among examinees, and presumably an impor-
tant source of measurement error, pertains to the type of test being 
given. Recall tests often are assumed to be more cognitively demand-
ing than recognition tests. Most empirical studies echo this difference 
by revealing higher correlations between performance and confi-
dence (or accuracy) judgments on recall tests. One reason for higher 
correlations is less restriction of the range of scores on recall tests 
when compared to recognition tests. Because recall tests are more 
difficult, their scores will vary across a wider range of possible values. 
In contrast, easier recognition tests restrict the observed range of a 
correlation due to homogeneous performance or ceiling effects. 
Another inadvertent problem of recognition tests is that examin-
ees are influenced by the availability of information included in the 
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test item. Because test answers are provided explicitly in a recogni-
tion test, but must be generated in a recall test, examinees are 
significantly more confident when monitoring recognition tests, but 
more accurate when monitoring recall tests (Ghatala, Levin, Foorman, 
& Pressley, 1989). 
A second major source of measurement error is the length of a 
test, or if it is a recognition test, the number of alternatives from which 
one may choose for each item. It is well established that a test's 
reliability is directly related to its length, with longer tests, and 
recognition tests with more alternatives, being more reliable (Crocker 
& Algina, 1986). Unfortunately, many early studies of monitoring 
used multiple tests with one or two items per test, rather than the 
preferable one test with a large number of items. To illustrate, 
Glenberg et al. (1987) reported no statistically significant relationship 
between pretest judgments of learning and subsequent performance. 
This group of experiments required individuals to answer one main 
idea question per test for a large number of tests. Replicating this study, 
having first increased the length of each test, Weaver (1990) fOlmd that 
the observed value of r increased monotonically as a function of test 
length, until it reached an asymptotic value of r = .60. Thus, Glenberg 
et al. (1987) failed to identify a significant relationship between judg-
ments of learrung and test performance due to unreliable test scores. 
A third source of error is test difficulty. Monitoring accuracy 
declines as a test becomes more difficult, even when test performance 
is controlled statistically (Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Schraw, Dunkle, 
Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995). In addition, overconfidence is more 
common than underconfidence and more likely to occur when a test 
is difficult (Cutler & Wolfe, 1989; Newman, 1984). These patterns 
have been observed on a variety of tasks including probability judg-
ments (Fischhoff, 1988), reading comprehension (Glenberg et al., 
1987), recalling emotions (Thomas & Diener, 1990), and social judg-
ments (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990). 
There are at least two reasons a difficult test may interfere with 
control and monitoring processes. One is that individuals lack 
sufficient background knowledge to answer the test question. It is 
well known that individuals resort to a number of helpful, but fallible, 
heuristics under these circumstances that bias their judgments 
(Fischhoff, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). A second reason is that 
information in memory is inaccessible during testing (i.e., available in 
memory, but presently unretrievable). Partial or total inaccessibility 
may lead to severe judgment bias due not only to poor monitoring, 
but fallible retrieval processes as well (Koriat, 1993, 1994). 
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A fourth source of error is knowledge about the test. Test-
relevant knowledge may affect control and monitoring in several 
ways-namely, by enabling examinees to identify test-relevant infor-
mation more efficiently, process information at a test-appropriate 
level (McDaniel & Einstein, 1989), and utilize self-generated feedback 
(Glenberg et al., 1987). In general, as knowledge of the test increases, 
performance and the reliability of tests improve as well (Schwartz & 
Metcalfe, 1994). Research by Metcalfe (1993) also found that admin-
istering a test that was not expected reduced the correlation between 
performance judgments and actual performance dramatically. 
Person Constraints 
There are a number of ways that prior knowledge might affect 
control and monitoring processes negatively, and thereby reduce the 
reliability of measurements (Baker, 1989; Garner & Alexander, 1989). 
Insufficient knowledge may preclude the use of helpful learning and 
test strategies and lead to lower performance. Lower performance 
may, in turn, lead to a resh·iction in the range of observed test scores. 
Low domain knowledge also makes a test more difficult, which has 
several deleterious effects on monitoring already described above. 
It is possible that prior knowledge interacts with many of the 
constraints described above in complex ways. For example, low prior 
knowledge presumably affects the degree to which individuals learn 
information during a pretest study session. Poorer learning leads to 
a greater amount of inaccessible information and a more difficult test. 
Low prior knowledge in a domain also may restrict deeper informa-
tion processing that could affect performance on some test questions, 
but not others. 
It is important to note, however, that increasing prior knowledge 
per se does not seem to improve monitoring (Nelson & Narens, 1990; 
Pressley et al., 1990), unless the inclusion of prior knowledge provides 
an opportunity for self-generated feedback or additional knowledge 
about the test itself (Glenberg et al., 1987). For example, research by 
Morris (1990) found that although knowledge was related positively 
to performance, it was not related to monitoring accuracy. Schraw 
(Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Schraw et al., 1995) extended these findings 
across multiple domains, arguing that individuals possess a domain-
general (i.e., knowledge-independent) monitoring skill that is inde-
pendent of domain knowledge. Glenberg and Epstein (1987) also 
reported that higher levels of expert knowledge actually interfered 
with accurate monitoring. 
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Summary 
Empirical studies of control and monitoring lag behind 
metacognitive theory. One important reason is that each of these 
processes is difficult to operationalize experimentally and to manipu-
late directly. Researchers have relied on several limited measurement 
paradigms, including error detection (see Baker & Cerro, this volume) 
and subjective calibration judgments. Both of these methodologies 
are fraught with measurement problems related to the nature of the 
task itself, to factors including the type and difficulty of the test, and 
to characteristics of the examinee. 
In subsequent sections of this chapter we argue that self-adapted 
testing allows researchers to eliminate many of these problems, and 
thereby increase the construct validity of tests (Rocklin, O'Donnell, & 
Holst, 1995), by (a) controlling for test and item difficulty using a 
calibrated pool of independent test items, (b) reducing measurement 
error attributable to characteristics of the examinees such as ability 
and prior knowledge, (c) utilizing unobtrusive measures that do not 
compete for the examinees' limited resources, and most importantly, 
(d) allowing the test taker to exercise a much greater degree of control 
during the testing process. We turn now to a brief overview of 
computer-based testing and two recent developments: computerized 
adaptive and self-adapted testing. 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT 
Item Response Theory 
During the past few decades, Item Response Theory (IRT), has 
emerged as the psychometric model used by an increasing number of 
testing programs in education and psychology. For large-scale achieve-
ment and proficiency tests in particular, IRT has largely supplanted 
classical test theory as the basis for test development, scoring, and 
equating. The central concept of IRT is the item characteristic curve 
(ICC), which specifies the relationship between the level of an 
examinee's proficiency (i.e., estimated ability) and the probability that 
he or she passes the item. 
The most commonly used IRT models assume that there is a 
monotonic relationship between examinee proficiency and the prob-
ability of passing an item. In addition, it is assumed that the set of test 
items under consideration is unidimensional (i.e., measures a single, 
unobservable construct). It has been typically found, however, that 
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the IRT model will adequately fit the test data if there is one suffi-
ciently dominant factor underlying the items. A detailed explanation 
of IRT is beyond the scope of this chapter; the interested reader is 
referred to Hambleton, Swaminathan, and Rogers (1991) for a good 
overview of basic IRT concepts. 
Two principles of IRT are particularly relevant to the present 
discussion. The first is a key property of IRT, termed invariance, 
which states that an examinee's proficiency is independent of the 
characteristics of the items that are administered. Consider the case 
in which there is an available pool of 400 test items, and that it is larger 
than would be administered to a given examinee (e.g., 100 items) 
during a testing session. Regardless of which 100 items were admin-
istered from the pool, the examinee's expected proficiency estimate 
would be invariant. Invariance holds because IRT -based proficiency 
estimates take into account both (a) characteristics (primarily diffi-
culty) of the items that were administered and (b) the examinee's 
performance on those items. An important implication of invariance 
is that two examinees can receive completely different tests, drawn 
from the same item pool, yet their proficiency estimates can be 
compared. Any differences in difficulty of the two tests are taken into 
account by the IRT estimation procedure. 
It should be noted that invariance is not a feature of the classical 
test theory measurement model, in which proficiency estimation is 
based solely on test performance (i.e., number of items passed). If two 
examinees take two tests that differ in difficulty, then the difference 
between the examinees' proficiency levels is confounded with the 
difference between the difficulty of the tests. 
A second principle of IRT that is of particular relevance to the 
study of examinee monitoring and control is that the difficulty param-
eters of the ICCs, which indicate the relative difficulties of the items, 
are placed on the same scale as examinee proficiency. This joint 
scaling is depicted in Figure 1, which indicates that Item 1 is the least 
difficult item, followed by Item 2, and so on through Item 5. More-
over, examinee A is the least proficient of the three examinees, and 
Examinee C the most proficient. 
Measuring difficulty and proficiency on the same scale allows one 
to assess the degree of match between the difficulty of an item and an 
examinee's proficiency. Why is this joint scaling important? The 
closer the match between an item's difficulty and an examinee's 
proficiency, the more informative is the examinee's response to that 
item in estimating his/her proficiency. Hence, more difficult items 
are most informative for more proficient examinees, whereas less 
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difficult items are most informative for less proficient examinees. In 
Figure I, the most informative items for Examinees A, B, and Care 
Items 2, 3, and 5, respectively. 
Figure 1. The joint scaling of item difficulty and examinee proficiency in IRT. 
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Computer-Based Testing 
With the introduction and rapid proliferation of microcomputers 
came an increased use of computers to administer tests. There are a 
number of advantages realized with computer-based testing that may 
make it attractive to examinees, including the capability for on-
demand testing, as well as immediate test scoring and reporting of 
results. From a researcher's standpoint, however, computer-based 
testing provides two additional advantages. First, it allows a much 
greater degree of control over the test administration. Such control 
may include (a) the order in which items are considered and an-
swered, (b) how long each item is presented, and (c) whether or not 
examinees are allowed to review, and possibly change, their answers 
to items. Second, it allows the researcher to unobtrusively collect a 
great deal of information about the test session, such as how long an 
examinee took to respond to each item or whether or not the examinee 
changed his/her answers to any test items. Because of these advan-
tages, a computer-based test provides a unique opportunity for re-
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searchers to study examinee test-takil1.g behavior. With paper-and-
pencil tests, such advantages are unavailable. 
Computerized Adaptive Testing. Computerized adaptive testing 
(CAT) combines the psychometric advantages of IRT with the com-
puting power of current microcomputers. In a CAT, a computer 
algorithm is used to match the difficulty of the items administered to 
the estimated proficiency of each examinee. At each step in a CAT, 
the next item to be administered is a function of the examinee's 
responses to previously administered items. Using a CAT, examinee 
ability is estimated more efficiently than with a conventional test 
because typically fewer items are required to attain the same degree 
of measurement precision. It has typically has been found that a CAT 
requires about half as many items to estimate an examinee's profi-
ciency with the same degree of precision as a paper-and-pencil test. 
Note that both of the IRT principles discussed earlier are essential 
to a CAT. Because item difficulty and examinee proficiency are on the 
same scale, items having difficulties matching an examinee's current 
proficiency estimate can readily be identified and administered. And, 
because examinees receive unique tests, the invariance property al-
lows their proficiency estimates to be compared. 
Self-Adapted Testing. Although CAT is by far the most popular 
application of IRT in computer-based testing, other applications have 
been studied. One of these is self-adapted testing (Rocklin & O'Donnell, 
1987). A SAT is similar to a CAT with one important exception. In 
a self-adapted test, the examinee is allowed to choose the difficulty 
level of each test item administered, whereas in a CAT a computer 
algorithm chooses each item to be administered based on the 
examinee's performance on items administered earlier in the testing 
session. 
In a SAT, an examinee chooses the difficulty level of each item 
administered from an item pool has been divided into several (typi-
cally 5-8) ordered difficulty levels, or strata, based on the IRT diffi-
culty parameters of the items. This relationship among difficulty 
levels is illustrated in Figure 2. Testing begins with the examinee 
choosing the difficulty level of the first item, at which point an item 
from the chosen stratum is drawn (without replacement) in a random 
fashion and administered. After this item is answered, the examinee 
is then asked to choose the difficulty level of the next item. This 
procedure continues until a predetermined number of items has been 
administered or a desired precision of proficiency estimation has been 
reached. After item administration is completed, the examinee's test 
performance is calculated using an IRT-based proficiency estimation 
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method. As with a CAT, because proficiency estimation is IRT based, 
the invariance property insures that the test performances of different 
examinees receiving a SAT can be directly compared even though 
they may have chosen to be administered tests that varied substan-
tially in difficulty. Successful implementation of a SAT is largely 
dependent on the instructions presented at the beginning of the test. 
It must be explained to examinees that their test performance will be 
evaluated on the basis of the difficulty levels they choose as well as 
the number of items that they pass. Because most examinees are used 
to taking tests where performance is based solely on how many items 
are passed, examinees taking a SAT may tend to choose low difficulty 
levels unless adequate instructions are provided. Hence it is very 
important to provide examinees with clear instructions when admin-
istering a SAT. An example of instructions used with a SAT are found 
in Wise, Plake, Johnson, and Roos (1992) . 
The research on SAT conducted thus far has focused on its effects 
on test performance and its relationship to examinee affective vari-
ables. Several studies have compared SAT with CAT, finding that 
examinees receiving a SAT obtained significantly higher mean profi-
ciency estimates (Roos, Plake, & Wise, 1992; Wise et al., 1992; Vispoel 
& Coffman, 1994). Moreover, the difference in mean estimated 
proficiency between SAT and CAT has been found to interact with 
other variables. Significant interactions have been found between test 
type and examinee scores on the Test Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 
1980), with the difference in mean estimated proficiency between SAT 
and CAT increasing with examinee test anxiety (Rocklin & O'Donnell, 
1991; Vispoel & Coffman, 1994; Vispoel, Rocklin, & Wang, 1994; 
Vispoel, Wang, de la Torre, Bleiler, & Dings, 1992). In addition, 
Figure 2. Item Difficulty level strata in self-adapted testing . 
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Vispoel et al. (1994) found a significant interaction between examinee 
verbal self-concept and test type, with the largest difference in mean 
estimated proficiency between SAT and CAT being associated with 
low examinee verbal self-concept. 
There also is evidence that the use of a SAT moderates the 
relationship between examinee anxiety and test performance. In two 
studies comparing SAT and CAT it was found that examinees admin-
istered a SAT reported significantly lower post-test state anxiety than 
examinees administered a CAT (Roos et al., 1992; Wise et al., 1992). It 
has also been found that a SAT yields proficiency estimates that are 
less related to test anxiety than those obtained when a CAT or a 
conventional test is used (Rocklin & O'Donnell, 1991; Vispoel & 
Coffman, 1994; Vispoel et al., 1994; Vispoel et al., 1992). The findings 
from these studies suggest that use of a SAT reduces the influence of 
anxiety on test performance. 
CONTROL, MONITORING, AND SELF-ADAPTED TESTING 
Although previous research on SAT has focused on its effects on 
anxiety and test performance, a SAT also affords an opportunity to 
measure elements of metacognition. To tmderstand this, it is useful 
to consider the activities of the examinee during his/her test. A 
difficulty level is chosen by the examinee, an item is administered, the 
examinee answers the item, and the examinee is provided a choice for 
the difficulty level of the next item. This sequence is repeated wltil the 
test is completed. 
We have observed that most examinees vary their difficulty level 
choices during the course of a SAT. Moreover, it has been found that 
many examinees tend to adjust their difficulty level choices to receive 
items that are well-matched to their proficiency levels (Wise et al., 
1992). That is, many examinees taking a SAT appear to be motivated 
to attain the same difficulty-proficiency match that is explicitly sought 
by the computer algorithm in a CAT. 
What psychological processes might be involved in attaining this 
match? We contend that two key processes are monitoring and 
control. Monitoring is required to assess the difficulty of the previous 
item, and to compare its difficulty to one's perceived proficiency. 
Control is then required to make a strategic choice, regarding the next 
item's difficulty, on the basis of the perceived degree of match 
between item difficulty and proficiency. If the match is sufficiently 
close, then the examinee will likely choose the same difficulty level as 
the previous item. If the match is not judged to be close then the 
examinee will change difficulty levels in order to attain a closer 
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difficulty-proficiency match. For example, if the examinee's monitor-
ing process yields a judgement that the previous item was too easy, 
then the control process will choose a more difficult next item. 
Thus, whereas most of the previous research on SAT has focused 
on the outcomes of taking a SAT, there is important information to be 
gained by studying the process of taking a SAT. Through an analysis 
of the SAT experience, we see that, although both monitoring and 
control playa major role in the examinee's strategic choices, the 
observable examinee behavior (difficulty level choice) most directly 
reflects the control process. Later in this chapter we outline several 
ways of using the data from a SAT to construct measures of the 
control process. 
Some Methodological Advantages of SAT 
Self-adapted testing provides a unique, unobtrusive method for 
gathering information about metacognitive processes, and especially 
of control. Indeed, examinees need not be given specific instructions 
about control or monitoring, or even know that their test behaviors 
provide relevant information about these processes. The fact that 
control processes are studied unobtrusively has two important ad-
vantages. One is that examinees are able to focus all of their resources 
on the test, rather than dividing their attention between performance 
and control-assessment activities. A second advantage is that direct 
measures of metacognitive control are available (i.e., item selection 
time and accuracy), rather than an indirect, subjective assessment of 
control (i.e., confidence or accuracy judgments). 
SAT has a number of other advantages as well that pertain 
specifically to the task, test, and person constraints described earlier 
in this chapter. The most important of these is examinee control. 
Whereas all previous studies have asked examinees to complete a test 
designed by researchers, SAT enables an examinee to choose items that 
he or she feels are best suited to his or her proficiency without compro-
mising comparability among examinees. With respect to the study of 
metacognition, individuals with a high degree of metacognitive control 
should be able to select difficult, yet answerable items. Those with less 
control may select test items that are less appropriate for them. Those 
with poor control may regularly select items that are too easy or too 
difficult. The self-controlled nature of SAT enables researchers to 
study the relationship among selection time, accuracy, and overall 
test proficiency, as well as a variety of self-report judgments made 
prior to, during, or subsequent to the test. Experiments could be 
expanded to examine motivational variables as well. 
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SAT also may increase the construct validity of proficiency esti-
mates, and presumably measures of metacognitive control, by reduc-
ing confounds due to anxiety (Rocklin et al., 1995; Wise, 1994) and test 
difficulty. This helps to reduce or eliminate many of the test-based 
constraints typical of previous studies. For example, given that 
individuals select test items from a pool of calibrated items, the 
difficulty of these items should have little effect on the accuracy of 
metacognitive control. This is in stark contrast to traditional paper-
and-pencil tests in which examinees monitor their performance with 
greater bias as test items increase in difficulty. 
Another strength of SAT is the property of invariance, which 
enables each examinee to select items that are optimally suited to his 
or her proficiency. Differences in the absolute difficulty of items need 
not compromise estimates of metacognitive control. This means that 
measures of metacognitive control are comparable on the same scale 
even though individuals may be administered different test items and 
even though individuals differ with respect to underlying ability. 
The fact that SAT yields comparable es timates of proficiency and 
metacognitive control regardless of differences in ability eliminates a 
crucial person constraint in the study of metacognitive processes. It 
is likely that prior knowledge also has less impact on proficiency and 
control estimates than it would using paper-and-pencil tests. Although 
prior knowledge may greatly affect which items an examinee selects, 
item selection in itself does not affect estimates of proficiency. On the 
other hand, it is possible that individuals with no prior knowledge, or 
a great deal of it, may be poorly suited to the test if tl1ere are an 
insufficient munber of test items near theiJ: true proficiency level. 
In summary, we believe that self-adapted tes ting provides a 
unique opportunity to study on-line metacognitive control processes 
in an unobtrusive manner. The ability to do so permits researchers to 
explore a number of theoretical relationships among control, monitor-
ing, and other cognitive skills (e.g., working memory span) that 
remain unanswered. We describe several intriguing questions in a 
subsequent section on future research. First we describe two method-
ological constraints on the use of self-adapted testing, then we de-
scribe a number of direct or derived measures of metacognitive 
control that are available from a typical SAT testing session. 
Two Methodological Considerations 
Two key issues must be addressed when using a SAT to measure 
metacognitive control strategies. Firs t, the distribution of the item 
difficulties should span the range of the distribution of examinee 
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proficiencies, with enough items throughout the range that an exam-
inee could take an entire SAT consisting of items with the same 
general level of difficulty. Having an item pool that is both "wide" 
and "deep" prevents examinees from being administered items that 
are not well matched to proficiency solely because well-matched 
items are unavailable. 
A second consideration concerns the instructions given to the 
examinees. Without instructions for examinees to try to attain a close 
difficulty-proficiency match, it is unclear whether examinees who did 
not choose closely matched items did so because they were unable to 
match well or because they chose their items to attain another goal 
(e.g., reduction of test anxiety). Hence, examinees should be explicitly 
told to try to attain a close match. This, however, raises a troublesome 
new problem-how does one word such instructions such that exam-
inees unequivocally understand their task? 
The resources required to administer a SAT pose a third restric-
tion on its use in metacognitive research. To administer a SAT, one 
must have (a) an item pool that is of sufficient size and has a broad 
range of item difficulty, (b) IRT parameter estimates for each item, 
and (c) computer software for administering computer-based tests. 
Regarding the item pool, it is important to have a distribution of item 
difficulties that spans the range of examinee proficiencies, and is 
"deep" enough that an examinee could choose a difficulty level that 
reflects a close difficulty-proficiency match many times without ex-
hausting the difficulty level and being forced to receive items that are 
less well-matched. As an illustration, if a researcher plans to use eight 
difficulty levels in administering a 20-item SAT, the item pool should 
contain at least 160 items. Furthermore, IRT item parameter estima-
tion requires a sizable calibration sample. Depending on the IRT 
model used, the typical recommendations for minimum calibration 
sample size range from 200 to over 1,000 examinees. Finally, special 
microcomputer software is needed to administer the SAT, such as the 
MicroCAT Testing System (Assessment Systems, 1994). Roos, Wise, 
Yoes, and Rocklin (in press) describe the program code needed to 
administer a SAT on the MicroCAT system. 
QUANTIFYING METACOGNITIVE PROCESSES USING SELF-
ADAPTED TESTING 
Although both monitoring and control processes appear to be 
at work in a self-adapted test, the control process is more easily 
quantified using measures obtained during the testing process. A 
self-adapted test that is administered using computer-based testing 
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software such as MicroCAT (Assessment Systems, 1994) can provide 
a variety of information that is relevant to the measurement of 
metacognitive activities. When a MicroCAT test is administered, an 
output file for each examinee is created containing a detailed record 
of the examinee's testing session. The file can contain an item-by-item 
record of the difficulty level chosen, whether the item was answered 
correctly or incorrectly, the examinee's current proficiency estimate, 
and its standard error, as well as the time taken both to choose the 
item difficulty level and respond to the administered item. This 
information is readily obtainable from the MicroCAT testing system 
and does not require extensive programming skills on the part of the 
researcher. A guide to developing self-adapted tests on MicroCAT is 
provided by Roos, Wise, Yoes, and Rocklin (in press). 
It is important to note that these measures are obtained in an 
unobtrusive manner. This mode of data collection allows examinees 
to focus their attention entirely on the test, alleviating concerns 
regarding the effects on test performance of requesting examinees to 
provide self-reports of metacognition. 
There are several ways to quantify the relationship between the 
metacognitive control process and test performance (i.e., proficiency). 
To further illustrate these quantifications, we will refer to Tables 1 and 
2. Table 1 is an example of a testing session for an examinee with a 
good match between proficiency and item difficulty, whereas Table 2 
provides an example of an examinee with a poor proficiency-item 
difficulty match. Each examinee is administered 20 items from a pool 
of calibrated items that are partitioned into six mutually exclusive 
difficulty levels. For each item administered, the difficulty level 
chosen is displayed in the second column where Levell contains the 
easiest items and Level 6 contains the most difficult items. The 
difficulty parameter of the administered item is displayed in the third 
column. The difficulty parameters of the items are obtained using IRT 
estimation methods; these parameter values are matched to the scale 
of examinee proficiency, which typically has a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. The higher the item difficulty parameter 
value, the more difficult the item. The fourth column indicates the 
difference between the examinee's proficiency and the difficulty of 
the item. For example, the examinee in Table 1 had a final (i.e., end-
of-test) proficiency estimate of -1.31, which is relatively low. The first 
item administered had a difficulty of -1.39, which indicates a close 
proficiency-difficulty match (.08). The fifth column lists the absolute 
value of the proficiency minus difficulty difference. The final column 
indicates the correctness of the examinee's answer to the item. 
Table 1. Testing Session for an Examinee With a Good Match Between Proficiency and Item Difficulty (Proficiency = - 1.31, I\) ~ 
Standard Error = .319) Q) 
Difficulty Item Difficulty Proficiency - Difficulty Absolute Item 
Item Level Chosen Parameter Difference Difference Outcome 
1 2 -1.39 0.08 0.08 Right 
2 3 - 1.13 -0.18 0.18 Wrong 
3 2 - 1.73 0.42 0.42 Right 
4 2 - 1.42 0.11 0.11 Wrong 
5 2 - 1.28 -0.03 0.03 Right 
6 2 - 1.30 -0.01 0.01 Wrong 
7 2 - 1.32 0.01 0.01 Right 
8 2 -1.50 0.19 0.19 Right 
9 2 -1.25 -0.06 0.06 Right 
10 2 - 1.39 0.08 0.08 Right 
11 2 - 1.77 0.46 0.46 Right 
12 2 - 1.67 0.36 0.36 Right 
13 2 - 1.30 -0.01 0.01 Wrong 
14 2 -1.57 0.26 0.26 Right (f) () 
15 2 - 1.27 
-0.04 0.04 Right I 
16 2 - 1.64 0.33 0.33 Right ::D » 17 3 -0.73 -0.58 0.58 Wrong ~ 18 3 - 1.24 -0.07 0.07 Wrong 19 3 - 1.12 -0.19 0.19 Wrong en 20 3 - 1.14 -0.17 0.17 Wrong m 
--::D 
0 
Mean Over the Last 5 Items: -0.14 0.27 0 (f) 
Table 2. Testing Session for an Examinee With a Good Match Between Proficiencyand Item Difficulty (Proficiency = 0.32, sn 
Standard Error = .620) s: m 
--i 
Difficulty Item Difficulty Proficiency - Difficulty Absolute Item » () 
Item Level Chosen Parameter Difference Difference Outcome 0 (j) 
Z 
1 3 -1.13 1.45 1.45 Right =i 
2 2 -1.39 1.71 1.71 Right 6 
3 2 -1.73 2.05 2.05 Right Z 
4 3 -0.73 1.05 1.05 Right » 
5 2 -1.42 1.74 1.74 Right Z 0 
6 3 -1.24 1.56 1.56 Right () 
7 3 -1.12 1.44 1.44 Right 0 
8 3 - 1.14 1.46 1.46 Wrong s: 
9 2 - 1.28 1.60 1.60 Right -U C 10 2 - 1.30 1.62 1.62 Right 
--i 
11 2 - 1.32 1.64 1.64 Right m 
12 2 - 1.50 1.82 1.82 Right JJ I 
13 2 - 1.25 1.57 1.57 Right OJ » 
14 2 - 1.39 1.71 1.71 Right (f) 
15 3 -0.54 0.86 0.86 Right m 0 16 2 -1.77 2.09 2.09 Right 
--i 
17 2 - 1.67 1.99 1.99 Right m 
18 2 -1.30 1.62 1.62 Right (f) 
19 2 - 1.57 1.89 1.89 Right :j Z 20 2 - 1.27 1.59 1.59 Right (j) 





The first measure of the relationship between metacognitive 
control and test performance is provided by the proficiency-difficulty 
differences. If instructed to attain a close proficiency-difficulty match, 
examinees should proceed through the test, monitoring the difficulty 
of the items administered and attempting to control subsequent 
difficulty level choices to attain a close proficiency-difficulty match. 
The degree to which an examinee is successful in controlling item 
difficulty will be reflected by the magnitude of his/her proficiency-
difficulty difference at the end of the test, with smaller differences 
indicating greater control. Because the items are typically arranged 
randomly within each difficulty level, perhaps a more reliable index 
of the proficiency-difficulty match is provided by the average differ-
ence taken over the last five items. This is a measure of bias-the 
degree to which an examinee tends to select items that are too easy or 
too difficult. For example, the examinee in Table 1 showed a very 
good proficiency-difficulty match (-.14), whereas the examinee in 
Table 2 exhibited a poorer match (1.84) indicating a bias towards 
choosing item difficulties that were too low. 
Another measure of control is provided by the absolute value of 
the proficiency-difficulty difference. This is an index of accuracy-the 
degree to which selected item difficulties are matched to an examinee's 
proficiency. This index is also quite different for the examinees in 
Tables 1 and 2, with the examinee in Table 1 exhibiting a substantially 
more accurate match. 
The standard error of the final proficiency estimate provides an 
alternative measure of accuracy. The more consistent the examinee is 
in choosing items well-matched to his/her proficiency level, the 
smaller the resultant standard error. Hence, the magnitude of the 
standard error indicates the accuracy of the examinee choices. The 
standard error for the examinee in Table 1 (.319) is substantially 
smaller than that for the examinee in Table 2 (.620). 
Additional information is available from the testing session that 
may also prove useful in the study of control and (possibly) monitor-
ing processes. One general type of information available is response 
latency; that is, the amount of time examinees take to (a) choose item 
difficulty levels and (b) answer items. Measures of this sort are very 
difficult to obtain in a traditional paper-and-pencil test but are easily 
and unobtrusively obtained when a test is administered via computer. 
Researchers also may gain a better understanding of the control 
process through an investigation of the strategies used by examinees 
in selecting item difficulties. A computerized adaptive test provides 
an efficient model of control because the item selection algorithm 
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strives for a close proficiency-difficulty match. It would be particu-
larly interesting, for example, to identify examinees who behave 
nearly as efficiently (or perhaps even more efficiently) as the comput-
erized adaptive algorithm. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURt RESEARCH 
Self-adapted testing allo~s researchers to investigate at least six 
questions pertaining to meta\~gnitive control, and the relationship 
between control and monitoring, that have not been addressed ad-
equately in previous research. We present these questions beginning 
with the most obvious and specific ones, gradually moving toward 
broader, more theoretical concerns. 
Question one pertains to the relationship between metacognitive 
control and test performance. Researchers often assume that more 
accurate control leads to better test performance. SAT enables one to 
test this relationship directly while eliminating confounds due to item 
difficulty and presumed t.mderlying ability. Existing theory also 
predicts a strong relationship between the accuracy of control judg-
ments and performance (Nelson & Narens, 1994; Schraw, 1994). 
Researchers could study the impact of practice, domain familiarity, 
instructions, and other test-specific constraints via direct manipula-
tion of these variables. Similarly, person-related variables such as 
prior knowledge and working memory span could be examined via 
blocking procedures, or treated as covariates. 
Question two addresses the relationship between metacognitive 
control and response latency variables, including item selection and 
item response times. It is important to note that measures of response 
latency do not provide pure measures of a single cognitive activity per 
se. For example, item selection times, especially in the middle and 
later parts of a test, reflect some mix of control, monitoring, and 
performance processes. Nevertheless, SAT provides the best avail-
able methodology for assessing the relationship between control 
accuracy and response time. There is little theoretical precedent thus 
far regarding the relationship between control mechanisms and laten-
cies. In general, response time and performance are related inversely, 
although the magnitude of the relationship, as well as its direction, 
depends on the type of variables being compared (Meyer, Irwin, 
Osman & Kounios, 1988). We expect a similar relationship between 
control accuracy and item response times. It is unclear, however, how 
control accuracy and item selection times are related. One plausible 
scenario is that individuals with a high degree of metacognitive 
control need little time to make strategic decisions, in part, because 
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many of these decisions are automated. This should lead to an inverse 
relationship between selection time and accuracy; that is, as control 
increases, selection times decrease. On the other hand, if item selec-
tion times include monitoring processes carried over from the previ-
ous item, we would expect a negative relationship between selection 
time and control accuracy. This assumes that monitoring is a rela-
tively nonautomated, time-consuming process. 
Data collected from SAT studies can be used to test competing 
hypotheses about the relationship between selection and response 
times, and control accuracy. One possibility is that this relationship 
changes systematically as a function of examinee knowledge, profi-
ciency, practice, or test efficacy (Rocklin et al., 1995; Wise, 1994). 
These changes could be studied easily by blocking examinees on any 
of these variables or by manipulating controllable variables (e.g., 
instructions) directly. 
Question three pertains to the specific relationship between ex-
pertise and control processes. Opinion appears to be split on this 
matter. Some researchers have suggested that monitoring accuracy is 
largely a by-product of domain-specific expertise (d. Glaser & Chi, 
1988). However, a number of recent studies (Glenberg & Epstein, 
1987; Morris, 1990; Schraw & Roedel, 1994) failed to show a relation-
ship between monitoring accuracy and domain expertise. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the relationship between monitoring and 
expertise may be quite different than the relationship between control 
processes and expertise. Currently, we know of no study that exam-
ines control accuracy across different levels of expertise. 
SAT provides a format for investigating the relative impact of 
expertise on control processes, including performance accuracy, con-
trol accuracy, and item selection and response times. Although we 
would expect expertise to be positively rela ted to test performance 
and estimated proficiency, we would not necessarily predict a corre-
sponding increase in control accuracy. This reflects our view that 
control processes are, in part, domain-general phenomena (d. Schraw, 
Dunkle, Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995). Although expertise should en-
able examinees to perform better on a test, their expertise need not 
improve their ability to control or monitor with a high degree of 
accuracy. 
A fourth question is the degree to which control accuracy is 
related to other cognitive variables such as general aptitude and 
working memory span. Very little research has been done in this area 
in general. Of studies that have investigated these relationships 
directly or indirectly, there is little evidence that aptitude is related 
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strongly to metacognitive processes in children (Alexander, Carr, & 
Schwanenflugel, 1995; Swanson, 1990) or adults (Pressley & Ghatala, 
1990; Yan, 1994). We know of no study investigating the relationship 
among control and monitoring accuracy and traditional indices of the 
speed and accuracy of working memory. 
Research in this area is important for two reasons. One is to 
establish the degree to which metacognitive processes such as control 
and monitoring are related to "hard-wired" cognitive differences 
such as general intelligence and working memory capacity (d. Jensen, 
1992). Evidence that metacognition is not related strongly to these 
variables would highlight the flexible, developmental nature of 
metacognitive knowledge. A second reason is to examine the com-
pensatory relationship between measures of cognitive ability and 
metacognitive knowledge. In a ground-breaking study by Swanson 
(1990), for example, metacognitive knowledge contributed to complex 
problem solving among young adolescents over and above the effect 
of ability. This finding suggests that metacognition may follow a 
separate developmental path, and may act independent of other 
cognitive mechanisms (see Alexander et al., 1995, for a further discus-
sion). 
Question five pertains to the still elusive relationship between 
control and monitoring processes. Several theorists have distin-
guished clearly between control and monitoring processes (Koriat, 
1994; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). 
Nevertheless, much of the empirical literature in the field has 
focused on monitoring rather than control processes, due in large part 
to the difficulty researchers face when measuring control. 
Some believe that control and monitoring are practically, if not 
statistically, linked (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994). Others believe that 
monitoring is both ftmctionally and statistically independent of con-
trol, and in fact, represents a fW1damentally different type of cognitive 
activity (Koriat, 1993, 1994). 
The literature is in need of further contributions on this point. We 
believe self-adapted testing methods can be used with tremendous 
advantage to address this question. Previously, we described how 
control processes may be quantified in a SAT via direct and indirect 
measures obtained w10btrusively. It also is possible to obtain mea-
sures of monitoring via subjective judgments made after answering a 
test question within the otherwise computer-based format of SAT. 
Control and monitoring indices could be compared over the course of 
a test to determine their relationship. If the two are linked, one would 
expect monitoring judgments made at item selection to be linked to 
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item selection at item i + 1. Data of this type, as well as a variety of 
derived indices of control and monitoring, could be used to test the 
efficacy of a regulatory loop that connects monitoring and control 
functions. In this view, monitoring processes provide data-driven 
feedback to control processes that use this feedback to iteratively 
guide future performance. This presumes that monitoring and con-
trol processes are flexible, reciprocal processes that communicate with 
each other, even if they do not share a common set of cognitive 
resources. 
It is possible that control and monitoring processes are related in 
different ways as a function of expertise. For example, control and 
monitoring may be related more strongly as expertise increases, 
provided these processes become mutually encapsulated within the 
expert domain (Glaser & Chi, 1988). If control and monitoring skills 
remain domain-general in nature, then expertise within a domain 
should not matter. Another possibility is that control and monitoring 
are unrelated (Koriat, 1993, 1994). In this view, monitoring processes 
are "parasitic" in that they are based on domain know ledge and 
efficacy beliefs within the domain, rather than a metacognitive mecha-
nism that actually monitors the accuracy of performance independent 
of domain knowledge. 
A final question addresses the degree to which individuals are 
better able to control their subsequent performance than, for instance, 
a minimum-error computer algorithm. Part of our interest in this 
question stems from the finding that some individuals perform better 
on a SAT than on a comparable CAT (Rocklin, 1994; Wise et al. 1992; 
Wise, Roos, Plake, & Nebelsick-Gullett, 1994). Wise (1994, p. 18), for 
example, stated "when examinees are allowed to choose their test 
item difficulty levels, they perceive a sense of control over the test, 
which serves to reduce anxiety" and which presumably improves 
performance. Echoing Wise's (1994) thoughts on perceived control, 
Rocklin et al. (1995, p. 114) stated that "the effects of self-adapted 
testing can be attributed specifically to the control that examinees 
exert over the difficulty levels of items they attempt." One explana-
tion of the difference between SAT and CAT versions of the same test 
is that many examinees experience less anxiety when taking a SAT 
(Wise et al., 1994). Another explanation, although not mutually 
exclusive from the reduced anxiety hypothesis, is that some individu-
als are better able to control their performance than even the most 
accurate computer-driven selection algorithms. One way to test this 
difference is to offer good and poor controllers the opportunity to take 
similar exams using both SAT and CAT formats. Coupled with on-
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line or retrospective verbal reports, a comparison between the two 
methods may illuminate some of the subtle control processes used 
during testing. _ 
These six questions present an impressive array of topics that 
warrant further research. Understanding control processes with more 
precision is important in and of itself. However, understanding the 
crucial relationship between control and monitoring is even more 
important, because it is inconceivable that researchers could claim to 
understand metacognition without understanding the locus and func-
tions of control and monitoring under a wide variety of circum-
stances, as well as the relationship between them. Similarly, it is 
essential to understand what makes a highly metacognitive person so 
able to self-regulate his or her behavior. Comparing good and poor 
controllers (and monitors) to existing computer software may provide 
some illustrative insights that increase our understanding, while 
posing new research questions. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter explored some of the possibilities of using a com-
puter-based testing format to investigate metacognitive processes. 
We reviewed recent research on control (i.e., regulatory processes 
used to guide cognitive activities) and monitoring (i.e., regulatory 
processes used to evaluate the present success of one's performance) 
functions of metacognition. 
After highlighting some of the basic assumptions of computer-
based testing, we described several specific strengths of self-adapted 
testing (SAT). We argued that SAT alleviates a number of serious 
methodological problems endemic to traditional tests. These in-
cluded confounds due to differences in ability, prior knowledge, and 
item difficulty. A more salient problem was that traditional tests do 
not allow examinees to exert full control over their test-taking behav-
ior. SAT eliminates this problem, and simultaneously offers research-
ers the opportunity to gather valuable information unobtrusively. 
We next considered some of the direct (e.g., item selection time) 
and indirect (e.g., control accuracy) measures available when using 
SAT. These measures can be used to answer a host of questions about 
metacognitive control, as well as the relationship between control and 
monitoring processes. In addition, it is possible to compare good and 
poor monitors, as well as to compare the same examinee under CAT 
and SAT testing conditions. These comparisons offer a unique oppor-
tunity to study many aspects of metacognition in a much more direct, 
yet unobtrusive manner. 
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Our main conclusion was that computer-based testing formats 
offer a number of new methodological avenues for the study of 
metacognition. We proposed six questions that warrant considerable 
research over the next decade. Chief among these is the relationship 
between control and monitoring processes, whether these processes 
share a common pool of resources, and whether they enjoy a recipro-
cal exchange of information indicative of a regulatory loop. Although 
little was said concerning developmental issues, we see little difficulty 
applying these procedures to younger examinees, provided individu-
als have some knowledge of the test domain, and researchers have 
access to a calibrated pool of test items. 
Finally, despite the tremendous potential of self-adapted testing 
as a tool for measuring meta cognition, we wish to emphasize its 
essential compatibility with other measurement techniques. SAT seems 
amenable to on-line and retrospective verbal reports, as well as to on-
line subjective performance judgments similar to those used in most 
monitoring studies. SAT also provides an opportunity to investigate 
the criteria examinees use to select test items. Concurrent verbal 
reports may be highly valuable in this regard. 
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